Some people are a hammer in search of a nail, but I'm a hammer in search of Kerberos delegation. So, when I heard that a WriteSPN edge was introduced to Bloodhound 4.1, I started exploring alternative abuse techniques beyond targeted Kerberoasting, and I found an edge case (pun intended) that can be chained together with Kerberos Constrained Delegation.
Suppose an attacker compromises an account set for Constrained Delegation but doesn't have the SeEnableDelegation privilege. The attacker won't be able to change the constraints (msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo). However, if the attacker has WriteSPN rights over the account associated with the target SPN, as well as over another computer/service account, the attacker can temporarily hijack the SPN (a technique called SPN-jacking), assign it to the other computer/server, and perform a full S4U attack to compromise it.
Also, if the target SPN is not currently associated with any account, the attacker can appropriate it similarly.Continue Reading
The techniques for DACL-based attacks against User and Computer objects in Active Directory have been established for years. If we compromise an account that has delegated rights over a user account, we can simply reset their password, or, if we want to be less disruptive, we can set an SPN or disable Kerberos pre-authentication and try to roast the account. For computer accounts, it is a bit more complicated, but RBCD can get the job done.
These techniques have their shortcomings:
- Resetting a user’s password is disruptive, may be reported, and may not be permitted per the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- Roasting is time-consuming and depends on the target having a weak password, which may not be the case.
- RBCD is hard to follow because someone (me) failed to write a clear and concise post about it.
- RBCD requires control over an account with an SPN, and creating a new computer account to meet that requirement may lead to detection and cannot be cleaned up until privilege escalation is achieved.
The recent work that Will Schroeder (@harmj0y) and Lee Christensen (@tifkin_) published about AD CS made me think about other technologies that use Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT) in Kerberos, and Windows Hello for Business was the obvious candidate, which led me to (re)discover an alternative technique for user and computer object takeover.Continue Reading
By default, domain joined Windows workstations allow access to the network selection UI from the lock screen.
An attacker with physical access to a locked device with WiFi capabilities (such as a laptop or a workstation) can abuse this functionality to force the laptop to authenticate against a rogue access point and capture a MSCHAPv2 challenge response hash for the domain computer account.
This challenge response hash can then be submitted to crack.sh to recover the NTLM hash of the computer account in less than 24 hours.
Once recovered, this NTLM hash combined with the domain SID can be used to forge Kerberos silver tickets to impersonate a privileged user and compromise the host. An example of this is to create a silver ticket for the CIFS service of the laptop in order to authenticate over SMB as the SYSTEM user and gain unrestricted access to the hard disk.
As the attack can be performed from a locked device, it can be utilised to bypass BitLocker full disk encryption and gain access to the devices file system.
In addition, as silver tickets can be forged for privileged users, this attack can also be leveraged to elevate privileges to that of local administrator on the device.Continue Reading
When gaining initial access on a host in a secure zone with restricted outbound traffic, establishing a command and control channel for an implant can be a challenge.
Using DNS for peer-to-peer command and control can be the solution, making the internal DNS servers your redirectors on the target network.Continue Reading
Halloween has come and gone, and yet NTLM reflection is back from the dead to haunt MSRC once again. This post describes a deceptively simple bug that has existed in Windows for 15 years.
NTLM reflection is still possible through a highly reliable timing attack. The attack works by abusing the logic responsible for its mitigation, a widely speculated challenge cache. Attackers can purge this cache by deliberately failing an authentication attempt and doing so removes all challenge entries older than 5 minutes.Continue Reading
Now that we finished our workshop “Constructing Kerberos Attacks with Delegation Primitives” at DEF CON 27, we can share the slide deck:
It was fun spreading the gospel, and we thank all the attendees for their participation.
Just in time for our DEF CON workshop “Constructing Kerberos Attacks with Delegation Primitives”, Microsoft failed to meet the disclosure deadline, and so we publish another primitive that can be abused to achieve Windows Local Privilege Escalation (LPE). It affects all domain-joined Windows 10 hosts by default, as well as Windows Server 2016 and Windows Server 2019 that have the WebDAV Redirector feature installed.
This attack is very similar to the LPE attack chain that we disclosed in “Wagging the Dog”. Actually, it is identical except for the primitive used to initiate the attack chain.Continue Reading
When lunch conversations at work take on a mischievous tone, all sorts of strange ideas come forth. This time, as Elad Shamir (@elad_shamir) was present, talk of course turned to his recent work on Kerberos, Wagging the Dog (or as I prefer to call it, “Screwing the Pooch”, its original title, which was eventually vetoed by a person far more sensible than either of us).
My fuzzing targets had gone stale, and I was on the lookout for new openings. Someone mentioned constrained delegation and began describing the flow of Kerberos messages. Well, what about Kerberos messages? How many researchers have in fact explored this attack surface for memory corruption? The lunch gang reasoned that the number could probably be placed in the hundreds if not thousands.
Owing to cockiness, I decided to investigate anyway.Continue Reading
Linux systems running LXD are vulnerable to privilege escalation via multiple attack paths, two of which are published in my “lxd_root” GitHub repository. This blog will go into the details of what I think is a very interesting path - abusing relayed UNIX socket credentials to speak directly to systemd’s private interface.
Ubuntu 19.04 Server edition comes with the LXD snap installed by default. The only requirement for this exploit in a fresh install of Ubuntu is access to a user account that is a member of the
Privilege escalation via LXD in general has been a known issue since 2016, with a simple method described in theory in a GitHub issue and also in a practical implementation in a security blog by @reboare.
I believe I am the first to describe exploitation using stolen socket credentials, which also works with unprivileged containers.
Before I came across these issues, nothing in the official LXD documentation existed to warn users that the
lxdgroup was dangerous. Anyone following the official guidelines to configure LXD would have added their account into this group before deploying their first container. I opened a bug with Canonical to express my concerns - you can read the full thread here. The LXD team quickly made adjustments to the documentation, which now clearly states that this group should only be given to those trusted with root access.
As always, interacting with the Canonical folks via their bug tracker was a really pleasant experience. I’d like to thank them for their time and for the thoughtful consideration they gave my ideas. I highly recommend other security researchers bring items directly to them in this manner.Continue Reading
In January 2019, I discovered a privilege escalation vulnerability in default installations of Ubuntu Linux. This was due to a bug in the snapd API, a default service. Any local user could exploit this vulnerability to obtain immediate root access to the system.
Two working exploits are provided in the dirty_sock repository:
- dirty_sockv1: Uses the ‘create-user’ API to create a local user based on details queried from the Ubuntu SSO.
- dirty_sockv2: Sideloads a snap that contains an install-hook that generates a new local user.
Both are effective on default installations of Ubuntu. Testing was mostly completed on 18.10, but older verions are vulnerable as well.Continue Reading
Back in March 2018, I embarked on an arguably pointless crusade to prove that the TrustedToAuthForDelegation attribute was meaningless, and that “protocol transition” can be achieved without it. I believed that security wise, once constrained delegation was enabled (msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo was not null), it did not matter whether it was configured to use “Kerberos only” or “any authentication protocol”.
I started the journey with Benjamin Delpy’s (@gentilkiwi) help modifying Kekeo to support a certain attack that involved invoking S4U2Proxy with a silver ticket without a PAC, and we had partial success, but the final TGS turned out to be unusable. Ever since then, I kept coming back to it, trying to solve the problem with different approaches but did not have much success. Until I finally accepted defeat, and ironically then the solution came up, along with several other interesting abuse cases and new attack techniques.Continue Reading
Mimikatz is a well-regarded post-exploitation tool, which allows adversaries to extract plain text passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets from memory, as well as perform attacks such as pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket or build a golden ticket. Arguably, the primary use of Mimikatz is retrieving user credentials from LSASS process memory for use in post exploitation lateral movement.
Recently, Microsoft has introduced Credential Guard in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016, which uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, and it is very effective in preventing Mimikatz from retrieving hashes directly from memory. Also, Mimikatz has become a prime target of most endpoint protection solutions, and they are very aggressive in their efforts to detect and prevent it. Although these efforts are bound to fail, they are increasingly becoming a nuisance.Continue Reading
Welcome to our new blog, where we will occasionally write about our research projects when we discover an interesting vulnerability or a new TTP, and if we are at liberty to publish them.
We hope you find our posts valuable and enjoy reading them.
We will publish an interesting post at the end of the month. Stay tuned!